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SECURITIES REGULATION: EXEMPTION OF SHORT
TERM PROFITS FROM RECOVERY UNDER SECTION I6(b)
SECTION i6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows a corpo-
ration to recover any profits made within a six month period by an
"insider"' trading in its securities, "unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted."2  Al-
though section I6(b) has been repeatedly litigated,3 the statutory
exemption, unmentioned in the legislative histoy,4 had not undergone
intensive judicial examination until the recent case of Rheem Mfg. Co.
v. Rheem.'
Defendant Rheem retired as chief executive officer of the com-
pany in 1958. Pursuant to the company's retirement plan which
allowed an election between insurance, company stock, annuities, or cash,
he chose to receive benefits in the form of stock. For accounting pur-
1 The term "insider" is defined by the statute to include "every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than so per centum of any class
of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered on a
national securities exchange, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such
security . . . ." 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 25 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958).
For a general discussion of judicial interpretation of this statutory definition, see 2
Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 2O91-2o8 (2d ed. 1962), and sources cited therein.
'"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within
any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not re-
purchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such
profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the
issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; .... " 48 Stat. 896
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
a For a general discussion of the problems litigated, see Cole, Insiders' Liabilities
Under the Securities Exchange 4ct of 1934, 12 Sw. LJ. 14-7 (2958) ; Cook & Feldman,
Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange Act (pts. 1-2), 66 HAI. L. REV.
385, 612 (2953) ; Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate
Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 468 (947).
'The legislative history of the act is found in H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 7 3 d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13-14, 24-25 (2934); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 2o-as (1934);
H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 7 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, 35-36 (1934).
r295 F.ad 473 (9th Cir. x961).
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poses the company issued Rheem a check for his final balance in the
plan, and he in turn gave his personal check for the number of shares
closest in value to this interest. He then assigned these shares to a
bank under a general pledge of all his assets made in connection with
a prior indebtedness. Later, the pledgee began selling the collateral.
At the request of a stockholder,' the corporation brought suit to recover
the profit realized. The trial court gave judgment for the defendant,
basing its decision on the finding, inter alla, that the stock was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted." On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Dealing separately with each element of the exemption, the court
first discussed the requirement of "a debt previously contracted." The
few earlier cases tended to give this phrase a rather narrow con-
struction. For example, acquisitions of stock through the exercise of a
conversion privilege8 or a non-assignable option to buy' have been
6 This same shareholder later intervened and appealed to the Court of Appeals
after the Board of Directors of the plaintiff corporation declined to do so. See 295
F.2d at 474.
'The trial court made two other relevant findings of fact: (x) the defendant
acquired his stock six months prior to the initial sale by the bank; (z) the defendant
did not sell any stock of the plaintiff corporation. Id. at 475. Although either
finding would have been sufficient to exempt Rheem from the operation of the statute,
the Ninth Circuit preferred to rest its decision solely upon the statutory exemption.
'Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, x6o F.2d 984. (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.s.
761 (1947) ; Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 6o4 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). In these cases,%
which arose from a single transaction, the defendant owned preferred stock which
was convertible to common at his option. He exercised this option, received common
stock, and subsequently sold it within six months. When the company brought suit
under § 16(b), defendant unsuccessfully urged that his acquisition fell within the
exemption. The court, pointing out that the ownership of stock creates only an equitable
interest, held that "the exception is dearly inapplicable to anything except transactions
in connection with actual debts." x6o F.2d at 987.
This problem is to be distinguished from that of whether such conversion is a
"purchase" under i6(b). See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION XO66-72 (2d ed.
ig6).
'Blau v. Ogsbury, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 9o,635 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 7 o
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) (no consideration of the exemption on appeal). Defendant's
employment contract gave him an option to buy ioooo shares of stock. The contract
provided that the date of mailing an acceptance would be the date of title transfer,
the defendant to become a debtor for the purchase price at that time. The option was
exercised on December 29, 1945, but the stock was not delivered and paid for until
December 13, 1948. Since the defendant had sold company stock within the previous
six months, he was sued under § 16(b) for his profits. His argument that the stock
came within the exemption was rejected: "The promise by the corporation to deliver
the stock upon payment did not constitute Ogsbury a creditor, as defendant contends.
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held not covered by the exemption. Even where stock was acquired
through warrants given in satisfaction of a contractual obligation, the
required "debt previously contracted" was held to be lacking."0 In
the instant case, however, the Ninth Circuit found the necessary debt,
which it defined as "an obligation to pay a fixed sum certainly and at
all events, existing prior to and apart from the settlement of the obliga-
tion by the transfer of stock.""
This definition is apparently consistent with those found in earlier
decisions. Thus the requirement that the debt exist apart from the
transfer of stock would eliminate transactions involving the exercise
of warrants and conversion rights. 2 Furthermore, any recurring debt
to be paid in stock would fail to come within the exemption because
the debt not only is inseparable from the transfer of stock, but also
does not represent a fixed, definite sum."
The court's definition, although consistent with the previous cases,
does raise other problems. First, it would encompass the obligations
incurred under many pension plans. By rule i6b-3,14 the Securities
and Exchange Commission previously had exempted from section
16(b) stock acquired under pension and incentive plans meeting certain
conditions designed to protect the stockholders of the issuing corpora-
The exception in the statute is limited to securities acquired in payment of an actual
debt." Blau v. Ogsbury, supra I 90,635, at 91,929.
"Trunale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam sub
noma. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.zd iozi (2d Cir. 1950). Defendant, the chief
financial officer of a corporation, received annual stock warrants as part of his com-
pensation. The exemption was held not to apply, although it is not dear from the
opinion whether the court based its decision on the ground that the recurring nature
of the contractual obligation precluded good faith acquisition of the stock, or on the
ground that there was no debt within the meaning of the statutory exemption.
The exemption has been held applicable in only one case. Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.zd 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). One defendant
paid a debt owing to a second defendant in company stock. The court held that the
shares received by the creditor fell within the exemption, but that the purchase of
shares by the debtor to pay the debt did not.
21 295 F.ad at 476.
"Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 16o F.ad 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (x947).
1 An example of such a debt would be the compensatory stock warrants involved
in Truncale v. Blumberg, 8o F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam sub
-nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.ad 1o2 (.d Cir. x95o). The warrants in this case
were for a certain number of shares, rather than for a definite sum of money. Thus the
monetary value of the debt could not be ascertained until the stock was acquired.
1 17 C.F.R. § "4 o.i6b- 3 (Supp. 1962).
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tion."5  If the Ninth Circuit's construction of the statutory exemption
is broader than the SEC's rule, the safeguards of the latter would
seem largely vitiated. The good faith requirement of the statutory
exemption will, however, serve as a check on these transactions. More-
over, the courts can continue to give weight to the judgment of the
Commission as expressed in rule 16b-3, requiring something akin to the
safeguards of that rule to establish good faith in future transactions of
this type.
The Ninth Circuit's definition, moreover, is susceptible of varying
interpretations. Indeed, under this definition the pension plan involved
in the instant case would seem to be a debt connected with a transfer
of stock and hence not within the exemption were it not for the option
provision allowing payment in other forms. Yet that option permitted
Rheem to decide whether he would take payment in stock or other
valuables, a determination which would naturally be influenced by inside
information. Thus the holding in this case would seem to allow "in-
sider" speculation, a direct subversion of the statutory purpose. How-
ever, the court emphasized that the definition was complementary to
the requirement of good faith,"' and that at no time did the defendant
use any inside information or act in bad faith. Thus, once again, the
requirement of good faith seemed to be determinative.
The court's constant emphasis on the matter of good faith clearly
showed it to be the "controlling question.' 8  Turning specifically to
this question, the court said that the party seeking to invoke the exemp-
tion has the burden of bringing himself dearly within it. 9 The
"
5Rule 16b- 3 sets forth three conditions which must be met for a plan to qualify
for the exemption: (i) the plan must be approved by a majority of stockholders of the
corporation i (2) the benefits dispensed must be controlled by disinterested committees;
(3) the dollar amount or number of shares received must be limited, either on an annual
or aggregate basis.
18 295 F.ad at 476.
" "The district court explicitly found that '[a]t no time did the defendant use
or attempt to use any information which may have been gained by him by reason of his
relationship to the plaintiff,' and that '[a]t all times defendant . . . acted in good faith
.with respect to the matters referred to in the complaint .. '' 295 F.2d at 477.
28 295 F.ad at 476.
The court summarily dealt with the question of whether the stock was acquired "in
connection with" the debt. The intervening shareholder argued that Rheem's issuance of
a personal check constituted an independent purchase of stock. The court rejected
such a narrow approach and looked rather to the substance of the whole transaction.
The various steps taken were required by the company's accounting practices and thus
should not alter the essential nature of the exchange. Ibid.1 1d. at 477-
[Vol. x962: 589
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intervening stockholder, supported by the only available authority,
argued that Rheem could sustain this burden only by showing that his
acquisition of stock was completely involuntary.20 The court stated,
however, that Congress intended here to replace the objective standard
used elsewhere in the Securities Exchange Act2 with a standard of
subjective intent. Therefore, volition in the acquisition was but one
factor to be considered in determining good faith.
Although the court did not explicitly mention other factors relevant
to good faith, some were implicit in its examination of the facts. One
such factor was the purpose for which the stock was acquired. The
court stressed the fact that Rheem chose stock in order to build up his
estate, a purpose not frowned upon by the statute.22 A related factor
was whether or not the defendant intended to sell within six months.
The court indicated that even an involuntary recipient of stock who had
such intent would come under the operation of section 16(b),." The
fact that the sale took place pursuant to a decision of the pledgee bank,
not of the defendant, was also considered. Although the statutory
exemption literally requires good faith only in the acquisition of securi-
ties, the nature of the subsequent sale would seem relevant as evidence
that the acquisition was in good faith. 4 In the instant case, however,
the court was not required to consider the effect of a voluntary sale on
this question. The primary factor thus seemed to be the possibility,
under a given set of facts, that the transaction might afford "unfair"
use of inside information. Indeed, the court indicated "that there may
... be cases so shot through with the possibilities of unfair speculation
that a party cannot overcome the inference of bad faith."25
2 One law review article said that "so long as the requirement of 'good faith' is
satisfied-presumably it would not be where the substitution of securities in satisfaction
of the claim was at the choice of the creditor-the opportunities for abuse of inside
information would not be present." Cook & Feldman, supra note 3, at 633. Another
article contended that "if it was not clearly necessary to take stock in payment [of the
debt], then we believe the courts will hold it not within the exemption contained in
§ 16(b)." Rubin & Feldman, supra note 3, at 487. This position is also supported
by dictum in Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"' No actual use of inside information or intent to sell out in less than six months
is required to give rise to liability under the general provisions of the act. All that is
required is a purchase and sale within six months by an "insider." 295 F.zd at 475.
22 295 F.d at 477.
.- The court felt that "in a given case the fact of involuntariness might not be
conclusive, for the creditor might still, upon acquisition of the stock, have advance in-
formation and an intention to get out on a short swing." Ibid.
2' Ibid.
2r Ibid.
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The detailed definition of "debt previously contracted" offered by
the Ninth Circuit in the Rze-m case would seem to vitiate somewhat
the effectiveness of rule i6b-3, and to create interpretative problems.
Thus the most significant contribution of the decision was its exhaustive
consideration of the "good faith" requirement of the exemption from
Section i6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Of course, the question
of good faith remains, as before, a matter for ad hoc decision. The
basic purpose of the statute is to prevent the use of inside information
to make a profit in company stock. As was done in the instant case,
the determination of good faith should be based on a critical examination
of all elements of the transaction in an effort to insure that actions taken
in derogation of this purpose are not successful.
